explicitly on working adults (if you're under 23, you have to get special permission to take their courses) with subjects, time-of-day (and Sundays), and course locations tailored to those students and centrally written course syllabi that stress concrete, rather than abstract, learning (as recently praised by their 55 year-old student commencement speaker).
Economically, it looks like a classic case of market entry -right out of an undergraduate micro theory or industrial organization course. Price less average cost equals unit profit. If a new firm's costs and price can be lower than those of existing firms, it can make a profit in that industry, attracting customers by price. Or, if the new firm can produce a product the customers like better, it lures them away from existing firms by product qualities.
Entry into Higher Education
But in higher education, there's a serious hitch in that familiar scenario. The structure of higher education is importantly unconventional in ways that have real implications for entry.
Looking at the cost-price-subsidy-hierarchy structure of higher education, reveals a set of facts that are very unusual in industry and very unfamiliar to, and even inconsistent with, our intuition [Winston-Yen (1995) and Winston (1999) ]. In higher education: 4 1 -Price is always less than cost.
2 -The difference is made up by "donative resources" -from appropriations, gifts, endowment, and physical wealth.
3 -That is not a transient condition, but a stable equilibrium.
4 -So each student-customer gets a subsidy, s = c -p n , as net price is less than cost.
5 -Those subsidies are ubiquitous within the industry.
6 -Individual schools' donative wealth -hence their ability to subsidize their students -is very different among the 3,300 US institutions.
7 -So higher education is a sharply hierarchical industry in which cost, price, and subsidies vary dramatically among schools. Table 1 summarizes these characteristics as revealed in 1995 IPEDS data. 4 I'll resist the temptation to say an awful lot about these figures, since I've done that frequently in the past. But a few facts deserve emphasis. For the average non-profit college and university in the US, the subsidy per student is $8,800 -an education that costs $12,500 to produce is sold to the student for a price of $3,700. That's the average.
And public and private schools, I think surprisingly, give their students very much the same average subsidy --$8,917 in the public sector and $8,673 in the private sectoronly $234 different. But those similar subsidies are the result of very different cost and against $5,780. 5 Net price is U-shaped, going down the hierarchy, bottoming out in the fourth decile and rising monotonically below that. Finally, a price-cost ratio organizes these same facts a bit differently, showing that the price paid by students in the top decile covers less than 20% of their educational costs -twenty cents on the dollar -while students at the bottom pay nearly 70% of their costs.
Profits and Subsidies
What does this mean for entry into such an industry by for-profit firms? The most important implications are, I think, pretty obvious. For any firm, unit profit = price -cost.
But we've just seen that in the typical college or university, student subsidy = cost -price.
So they're exactly the same thing with different sign: subsidy is simply negative profit;
profit is negative subsidy.
6
So a school's student subsidy shows how much an entering school would have to lower costs in order to compete with it on cost and price, nose to nose, and still make a profit. Since the average college or university in the US gives each student an $8,807 a year subsidy, the per-student educational costs of an entering firm competing strictly on price -producing exactly the same kind of education -would have to be at least $8,807
lower. The price-cost ratio puts this a bit differently: the entering firm would have to reduce costs -relative to the established college -by 1 -P/C or, for the average US school, by more than 70 percent.
Subsidies as Barriers to Entry
A school's student subsidies are a barrier to entry. They describe the minimum cost reduction necessary for an entering firm to compete with the existing school at a competitive price and still make an economic profit. They are, note, also a barrier to entry for, or to effective competition from, other non-profit schools, farther down the hierarchy.
And while the subsidy is least ambiguous as a measure of protection from pure Very few public sector schools appear to be highly vulnerable -only 3 percent of them -and while three out of four of these are two-year colleges, even those 32 schools represent only 4 percent of the 874 public two-year institutions in the data.
The lower section of Table 2 describes the vulnerable 30 percent of the colleges and universities -the bottom three subsidy deciles -tells much the same story if one 7 A word on the "specialized institutions" in Tables 1 and 2 . Behind the data are important differences in the kinds of schools that fall into that category between public and private sectors. In the private sector, the 203 specialized non-profit institutions in our population are largely religious (41%), business (17%), and art schools (21%) while in the public sector, the 50 specialized institutions are concentrated in health care (32%) and tribal schools (28%) -public medical schools often have enough undergraduates to have made it into our population. be is that these low-subsidy schools, in search of enrollments, have already moved into those practical, concrete, occupational-vocational curricula [Breneman (1994) , Winston Winston-Yen (1995) for the details of generation of the population from the IPEDS data, but one criterion was that 20% of the students be undergraduates.
(1999), and Trow (1997) ] that appear least protected from the new competition -"training," more than "education." And they've done it, by and large, with the old, conventional, methods. Levine (1997) : "...students are more likely to prefer concrete or practical subjects and active methods of learning while faculty are predisposed to abstract and theoretical subject matter and passive methods of learning. The result ... is frustration on both sides ...and a tendency for faculty to interpret as deficiencies what may simply be natural differences in learning patterns. This mismatch may cause faculty to think every year that students are less and less well-prepared and for students to think their classes are incomprehensible." (pp.8-9). 9 Levine (1997, p.17) : "What they [the new proprietary universities] will mean for faculty is a vastly different role, one that does not include participation in governance, and minimal activity in curriculum planning. The emphasis will be on increasing teaching productivity and eliminating scholarly expectations. Total salary costs will be lower, and all or most faculty will be part-time." BU, and others have shown -a more aggressive counterattack like one that capitalizes on an academic reputation to sell employee-education to major business firms, directly or electronically, meeting the for-profit firms on their own turf. Either way, the private nonprofit school that chooses to compete would probably retain its donative wealth which would protect some, at least, of its procedures and values and curriculum from pure commercial pressures, even while its operations were very much affected by those pressures.
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The other alternative -taking a cue from the health care industry -is that the weakened non-profit school might well sell out to a for-profit firm. Or become one. And while that may sound very straightforward, it isn't when you recognize that the distinguishing feature of a non-profit firm is that nobody owns it -it has no owners because of the "non-distribution constraint" that keeps it from distributing profits. So who negotiates its sell-out price on behalf of the vanishing school? And, more important, who gets paid the money?
The only hint I've come across on this is in a very nice New York Times piece on the sale of non-profit hospitals [Lewin with Gottlieb (1997) ]. In that industry, it's been presumed that the hospital "belonged," in some sense, to the local community so the forprofit purchaser paid the purchase price to a local foundation that was set up to negotiate price, receive the money and, subsequently, to spend it on community-related services.
There tends to be, predictably, a very fuzzy line between the buyer and the community 10 One can only speculate on what would happen to public support of an aggressive and successful public sector school -whether legislatures would withdraw tax support in light of their ability to earn private revenues or foundation and its management and there are clear and strong incentives for the buyer to influence the price it has to pay and even the subsequent use of its funds. Applied to colleges, the only solace is that -as seems apparent from the data above -the schools most likely to be sold to for-profit firms are those with the least resources, a fact that limits the scope, if not the principle, of potential skullduggery.
But in the kind of broad survey Ted Marchese has recently done, "partnering" 
III. The High-Subsidy Schools
Are the high-subsidy schools at the top of the hierarchy impregnable? UVA and
Williams and Duke and Yale and Swarthmore?
reward them for their practical community service.
"Impregnable" is probably a bit strong, but they're far more secure from the kind of survival pressures described so far, simply because their student subsidy barriers are so very high. In order to go nose to nose with Williams and still make some profit, a private firm would have, somehow, to overcome a $40,000 a year subsidy per student, cutting educational costs by some 60% while maintaining quality. In equilibrium, not just to break into the market. The average private school in the top decile gives a subsidy of $24,138 and has a price-cost ratio of 0.254. It's not likely either that costs can be cut or product improved enough by an entering for-profit firm to turn a profit, especially since the high quality, residential liberal arts education these schools often produce is handcrafted and appears highly dependent on peer interactions with other good students, so it is resistant to easy cost-cutting. And just what these schools actually sell is not well understood -as the many efforts of assessment groups have shown.
Competition for Courses
But there seems to be a more subtle threat to these schools in the form of forprofit "functional cherry-picking" -for-profit firms' competing with the high-subsidy school for part of what it does. Sharon Oster [1997] has done a very nice paper on the characteristics of institutional activities that make that kind of incremental for-profit entry attractive. She did it from the other end, asking about the characteristics of the activities that a non-profit university might choose to contract-out, but it's the same question, except for who takes the initiative. From the university's side, it's old hat: Saga and Marriot have long been supplying food services; Barnes and Nobel is a major operator of campus bookstores; ServiceMaster is a widely used contractor for maintenance and janitorial services, and so on.
The new pressure that for-profit education adds is on the curriculum -the "core mission" in Oster's phrase -and with it come immediate questions of university control and ownership of intellectual property -most fundamentally, what it is that the highsubsidy college or university sells. These are not questions that appear to have got a lot of serious attention -their answers may have seemed both obvious and elusive.
But if for-profit schools start competing for those parts of a curriculum -those courses and programs -on which they can make a profit, the whole argument about vulnerability above -about identifying vulnerable institutions by the size of their student subsidies -would be repeated within the high-subsidy schools' curricula to identify vulnerable programs and courses. Even the school that gives its students a $50,000 a year subsidy will have some courses and even whole programs maybe where student subsidies are much smaller, or even negative. 11 Or courses and programs amenable to significant technological cost-reduction.
Oster's construct is useful in this context, too. She identified two key dimensions of a university activity: the complexity of its goals and whether it is amenable to scale economies. Those activities that are complex and have no scale economies in production are the natural stuff of the non-profit; those that have significant scale economies and are 11 Different subsidies by function, of course, were identified by Estelle James (1978) twenty years ago as the basis of her analyses of internal cross-subsidies.
simple to define and monitor are the stuff to be contracted-out to the large for-profit firm;
activities that are small scale and simple are appropriate for contract to a small for-profit firm. The fourth kind of activity in the taxonomy -with complex goals but subject to scale economies -is a toss-up. And all this, she stresses, is set in a university environment in which management decisions have to be more explicitly politicalbalancing among stakeholders -than under for-profit organization. Trow (1997) describes some of these problems in the University of California system. While Oster made it very clear that she meant her analysis to apply only to ancillary activities and support services -not the school's core learning mission -the entry of for-profit schools into the curriculum of higher education breaches that convenient wall and when it does, her analysis seems relevant within the core activities, too. A university's curricular offerings differ markedly among themselves in the complexity of their goals, from the concrete (even vocational) courses to the abstract stuff of the liberal arts. And courses differ, too, in their ability to benefit from scale economies -Marchese reports that for-profit firms are putting together high-tech distance learning courses at a budgeted cost of $80,000 per instructional hour (so a one-semester course would cost $2 million to construct and market), suggesting that someone expects very large scale. Indeed, Oster's two dimensions, applied to a curriculum, seem to parallel the distinction that Bill Pulleyman -the head of IBM's Math Department -made between the company's internal "training" and its internal "educational" activities (with the significant fact that IBM sees only the first of these as amenable to high-tech methods)
[quoted in Roberts (1998) ]. High-subsidy colleges and universities do a lot of "training" and Breneman's study of Liberal Arts colleges (1994) suggests that they may have been doing more and more of it over time. And -to add one more nail -Hansmann has recently (1996) noted that government certification and licensing of complex things like educational programs and courses and their outcomes reduces the need for the buyers' trust that is the key transactional element provided by non-profit organization.
So if a highly TA-dependent accounting course, for instance, were one of a university's profitable offerings, a for-profit school in a shopping mall on the outskirts of town -or one entering the internet from Omaha or Osaka -might offer a better-taught course or a lower price. Of course, the university has to be willing to accept "transfer credits" in order for that competition to apply toward the university's degree, but if it refused to do so, simply because they those credits were from a for-profit school, that would raise all sorts of awkward issues -the role of Advanced Placement test credits and proficiency exams in areas like French and basic mathematics. And "partnering," again, means that such credits will increasingly come from schools with unexceptionable academic credentials like Wisconsin and Duke and NYU. "...
[A]ll institutions, Ivies and medallions included, may see their undergraduate franchise eroded as enrolled students appear in the registrar's office with brand-name course credits taken over the Web." [Marchese (1998) ]. Or at the mall. The local political elements of such a prospect might be quite difficult to sort out [see Oster (1997 ) and, especially, Trow (1997 So it seems that rather than being able to remain aloof and unaffected by for-profit competition -or enter the arena on their own terms -high-subsidy schools will, at the very least, have to know much more about the costs of their curricula -to do a subsidyby-course analysis of the sort done by school above -and think much more carefully about what it is they're selling and who's going to be allowed to produce its component parts.
III. Godzilla?
What can we take from all this? I think, broadly, two things: first, that the direct impact of for-profit competition will be very unevenly distributed among colleges, threatening the continued existence of only those schools with meager donative resources that give their students quite modest subsidies and, second, that wealthier, higher-subsidy 12 Bill Massy makes a compelling argument that it is just this distance from market-clearing, for-profit pressurethe subsidy in my terms -that allows higher education to be higher education. This is most conventionally framed in seeing large social externalities attached to the "less practical" and vocational curricula -to an educated polity -which suggest that its potential under-supply is now offset by public and private subsidies. [ Massy] schools will be forced to clarify what it is they sell, educationally, and who they will allow to produce it -raising sticky issues of intellectual property and ownership and governance and autonomy. Together, these will make for exciting times with real ramifications for the world we live in.
Does Society Benefit?
Let me end by skating onto even thinner ice to speculate briefly about whether this for-profit, privatized, competition is A Good Thing. principles are "higher education." It may feel egalitarian to take the position that everyone deserves the best, it seems often to have been unrealistic, producing a product that many of our customers simply don't much want to buy 14 .
If that's right, what's coming, driven by the for-profit sector, is a sharper differentiation of product with a greater variety of educational choices to match the greater variety of educational needs and interests inherent in a radically expanded and more heterogeneous student population. Levine calls it "a Boutique-ing" of higher education (1997, p. 3).
I think that addresses much of the "Is It A Good Thing?" question. Socially, forprofit competition will do what privatization is supposed to do -push toward a wider 13 And to Marchese (1998) and Levine (1997) , among others. 14 See again the Levine quote in n. 8, above.
range of products at lower costs and the elimination of inefficient and inappropriate schools. While the new information technologies may play a significant role in that push, as large part of it, I suspect, will come from the break with emulated traditions -like reliance on full-time tenured faculty, faculty governance and curricular freedom -that have trickled down the hierarchy of traditional schools but come under increasing pressure from the bottom of that hierarchy when firms are trying to make a profit. And the competition will not only replace many of the vulnerable schools, but forever alter the products and processes of those that successfully resist it.
The wealthy schools giving large student subsidies and expensive, traditional, residential educations that capitalize on peer quality will remain in the niche market they've always been in but with a clearer sense of what they are, what they do, and what role an aggressive for-profit sector should play in doing it. Those selective schools will continue to attract students through their high subsidies and continue to provide the externalities of an educated citizenry through an "impractical" higher education -but they will appeal to a small and very different segment of society than the for-profit schools that give the rewards of immediate and concrete training.
